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NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
COMMENTS
Nuisances-Erection of Towers on Land Adjoining Airport.[Pennsylvania] Defendant owned land adjoining the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania airport and-directly in the line of flight of airplanes using the airport
-erected a skeleton tower made of wood about eight feet square and extending to a height of approximately 154 feet with numerous guy wires
leading from the top to the ground. This tower fell and defendant immediately erected another one in its place, the second one extending to a height
of 98 feet. The latter was destroyed by fire and defendant threatened to erect
another tower. It was charged that the towers constituted public nuisances
and that a new tower would menace and endanger the lives and property of
the traveling public using the airport and the civil airway in the vicinity
thereof. An injunction was sought against defendant. In defendant's answer
it was alleged that aircraft trespassed upon the land in question to such an
extent as to deprive defendant of reasonable use thereof and that the towers
were erected to abate a nuisance created by the unlawful, illegal, incessant,
disturbing, noisy and dangerous low flying over tenant houses and tilled lands
by passenger planes and other heavy planes entering and leaving the airport.
At the time suit was instituted the airport was privately owned and operated
but prior to the decree it became the property of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. It was located on four civil airways maintained and supervised by both the state and federal governments and it was used in connection with interstate and intrastate flying. The court issued a permanent
injunction restraining the defendant from erecting, causing or permitting to
be erected any tower or structure for the purpose of interfering with the
aeronautic approach to or departure from the airport on or along the civil
airways of the Commonwealth.
Von Bestecki, et al.1

Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Schnader v.

The court gave only limited consideration to the question of the right of
flight over defendant's property concluding that whatever that right might
be, the evidence indicated that users of the airway were unreasonably annoying and disturbing defendant to such an extent as to amount to a private
nuisance for which the defendant had a remedy at law or in equity. The
court observed that defendant had not chosen to adopt such an orderly proceeding and instead had committed and had threatened to commit acts
dangerous to the air traveling public, "spring gun" cases 2 being referred to in
support of the determination that the towers complained of constituted public
nuisances. At the same time the court purported not to pass upon the
question of justification for attempted abatement of trespass or nuisance
on the ground that such justification as a defense was not properly pleaded.
It would seem that even if the question of justification had been at issue,
1. State of Pa., Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, March 15, 1937.
30 Pennsylvania District and County Reports 137, 235 CCH par. 1808; 1937
USAvR 1.
2. Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332; State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479,
83 Am. Dec. 159; Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. 1.
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the result in the case would have been the same, because of the dangerous
nature of the means adopted by defendant for abatement.
The court hesitated to express itself on the right of flight questionapparently because it felt that defendant was being unreasonably interfered
with by low flying. At the same time it concluded that "The erection of
towers, and the resultant menace to the public traveling on the civil airways,
constituted a public nuisance, the threatened recurrence of which may be
enjoined by a court of equity." It therefore appears that the court assumed
that there was a public right to fly over defendant's property and that its
3
holding was premised upon interference with this public right.
It was not necessary for the court to determine the exact minimum
levels of lawful flight over defendant's property, although its opinion might
have been strengthened if it had definitely concluded that there was a public
right to fly in the proximity of the towers. Such a conclusion probably
would have been supported by evidence concerning the public interests involved, the character of the use of defendant's property, and the extent of
interference with such use by the type of flying complained of. 4 If this conclusion had been expressed the basis for the injunction would have been
shown more clearly in view of the court's statement that "The tower is
likely to distract the attention of the pilot causing him to pay more attention
to the tower and give inadequate concentration to his airway;"5 and the
obvious fact that hazards would result to aircraft inadvertently operated
below otherwise proper levels due to mechanical difficulties, low clouds or
other circumstances. 6
FRANK E. QuINDRY.*
3. Compare similar case of Tucker v. United Air Lines, Inc. and the City
of Iowa City, State of Iowa. Dist. Ct. for Johnson County, September 14, 1935,
6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 622, and 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 293, 1936 USAvR 10;
Comment, 36 Columbia Law Review 483. See also Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 Fed. (2nd) 755, 1936 USAvR 1; Comment. 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 624.
4. Compare Smith v. New England Aircraft Company (Mass.). 170 N. E.
385. 393 ; Swetland v. Curtiss Airport Corporation, 55 Fed. (2nd) 201, 203, 204 ;
Hinman v. Paciftc Air Tronsport, supra; Tucker v. United Air Lines, Inc. and
the City of Iowa City, supra.
5. State v. Moore, supra; People v. Eckerson, 117 N. Y. S. 417 (excavation
so close to highway as to render travel thereon dangerous) ; Horr V. N. Y.
N. H. d H. R. Co. (Mass.), 78 N. E. 776 (mail bags piled so close to traveled
portion of public highway as to scare horses).
See also 45 C. J. 862. Sec. 287.
6. It has been held that navigators have a right to use banks of a stream
temporarily in cases of peril or emergency.
(45 C. J. 449, n. 51.)
In Rider v.
White, 65 N. Y. 54, a stranger, while traversing an unmarked highway, inadvertently passed over defendant's property and was injured by defendant's
dog which defendant knew was vicious. Defendant held liable for the injury.
* Of the Illinois Bar.

